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Intellectual Property and the
Academic Enterprise
Kenneth W. Dam*
Scholars who have chosen an academic career have traditionally
considered openness of information to be a key, immutable value.
This firmly held belief is particularly characteristic of academic
research scholars in science and technology. Their ethic is that
research results should be published, the sooner the better, and
available to all. And they in turn should have prompt, unfettered
access to the research results and even the underlying data arising
from other scholars’ work. That ethic is the essence of the 20th
century academic enterprise.
In the last several decades academic institutions have been led
by a combination of legislation and financial incentives—some
would say “greed” and others would say “financial necessity”—to
pursue measures arguably in tension with that ethic. Academic
institutions have sought exclusivity, through intellectual property and
particularly patents, with respect to certain applications of such
research information. A modern American research university has
become, to that extent, an academic enterprise in the economic
sense. The fact that patenting does not preclude publication, nor
greatly delay it, has obscured the tensions inherent between these
two senses of the high-minded academic enterprise concept.

*

Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University of Chicago. This
paper was prepared as the keynote address at a conference on The Changing Use
and Character of Intellectual Property held at the National Academy of Sciences
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conference was primarily devoted to the impact of expanded intellectual property
rights, and especially biomedical patents and proposed database protection, on
scientific research, especially in universities. Since most of the participants in the
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have concentrated more on policy issues than on legal or economic doctrine. I
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Under the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act universities were authorized
and in practice required to seek patents on innovations arising out of
research carried on with federal funding.1 Not only did patenting
become expected, but research universities set up offices to license
patents and increasingly to exploit patents through the venture
capital route. Few universities have found that the resulting licensing
and equity revenues have become decisive in their research and
teaching budgets. American universities expended nearly $20 billion
on sponsored research in 1997, yet received less than $500 million of
gross licensing revenues, before such patenting and licensing
expenses as nearly $100 million in legal fees.2 However, some of the
early successes, such as the Cohen-Boyer patents, captured the
imagination of universities and scientists across the continent. Small
wonder because by 1995 the Cohen-Boyer patents had returned
$139 million to Stanford, the University of California at San
Francisco and the two inventors!3 It is fair to say that modern
American research universities have become, at least in some areas of
science and technology, economic enterprises as well as centers for
teaching and research.
1

35 U.S.C. §§200-211, 391-307.
The Association of University Technology Managers publishes data annually.
The FY 1997 data for the 132 universities having more than one half-time
employee involved in technology transfer, reflected in the text, also show that the
type of university, especially whether the university has engineering departments,
makes a difference since applied research is in principle more likely to take place in
such a school than in basic science departments. (However, the fact that biological
science departments are major sources of patents is discussed later in the text.)
MIT (third largest in sponsored research) had about five times more sponsored
research than the University of Chicago, a university with no engineering
departments ($713 to $151 million) but eleven times more gross licensing revenue
($21.2 to $1.8 million). Universities without large graduate programs did
comparatively more poorly; Lehigh had $25 million in sponsored research but only
$113,000 in gross licensing revenue. Some of the biggest payoffs come in start-up
companies but the financial gain is not reported (though the start-ups are
sometimes patent licensees); MIT reported 17 new start-ups, Chicago two, and
Lehigh none. The rate of patenting is itself important insofar as it foreshadows
future licensing revenue. MIT filed for 292 patents with 134 issued, Chicago
applied for 44 with 23 issued, and Lehigh applied for 16 with 7 issued.
3
National Research Council, Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in
Molecular Biology 41 (1997).
2
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The resulting public policy issues have become particularly
pronounced in the biomedical sciences. In this fast-paced world it is
increasingly difficult to differentiate at the margins between basic
and applied research. Some would say that basic research in these
fields has a more immediate economic payoff than had been true in
most scientific fields in the past. Indeed, much of the enormously
increased public funding of the past few decades in the biomedical
sciences has been motivated by the hope of near-term improvements
in human well-being through improvements in public health and the
treatment of disease. Not only do these near-term payoffs necessarily
bring near-term financial opportunities to universities and their
faculties, but it is increasingly difficult to distinguish what major
research universities in these fields do from what major biotech and
pharmaceutical firms do. One can grasp the contemporary situation
in these fields by visualizing the activities of research universities and
money-making firms as a Venn diagram with the area of overlap
steadily increasing.
One concern in the academic community about these
developments arises from the fact that intellectual property plays a
central role. And with the proliferation of new forms of intellectual
property and particularly the steady strengthening of patent
protection, the scientific research community has become concerned
about the terms of access to research results and data and to research
tools.
Patents are not the only form of intellectual property that create
access problems and economic opportunities. Trade secret protection
by private firms, particularly of processes, can limit access to some
new technologies. Copyright protection can also be important,
especially on the opportunity side, as demonstrated by the fact that
the most important single innovation at the University of Chicago,
in terms of financial return for the University, has been a secondary
school mathematics textbook series based on new teaching methods.
Copyright has thus far not proved to be a serious impediment to data
access, not only because of the statutory “fair use” exception to
infringement, but also because copyright has its primary economic
function in protecting what is published and therefore available.
However, the growth of “self-help” (or “copyright management”)
systems to limit on-line copying and thereby help copyright holders
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capture the economic value of their works has raised a new set of
issues, which came to a head in October when Congress outlawed
the use of circumvention technologies with, however, broad
exceptions for academic users.4
The issue of the protection of uncopyrightable databases by sui
generis database legislation, a new type of intellectual property
raising concerns about access to information, particularly scientific
data, arose with the adoption of the European Union database
directive in 1996, especially in view of the intention of the U.S.
Administration to seek similar legislation, motivated at least in part
by a reciprocity provision in the EU directive. A storm of criticism,
especially in American academic circles, has delayed and perhaps
permanently derailed the adoption of an international treaty and of
U.S. statutory protection.
I.
Before outlining in more detail these issues, I should like to
present a simplified, albeit in application not so simple, framework
for discussing all intellectual property issues. In doing so, I shall
show how this framework allows us to conceptualize why it may be
appropriate to provide immunity against infringement liability for
certain academic uses of the protected information.
The first analytical principle is that all intellectual property
involves protecting information. Whether we are talking about
databases or inventions or writings, it is helpful to think of what is
being protected as information. Sometimes the information element
is obscured by the form of protection. A product patent gives the
patentee the power to exclude others from making, using and selling
the product. But if it were not for the legal protection accorded, the
fact that the innovation in question is information would be readily
apparent. But for the patent statute, the innovator could protect his
innovation only by keeping it secret. The centrality of information is
readily apparent in some of the newer controversies concerning the
alleged proliferation of arguably overly strong intellectual property
rights, such as the question of patenting nucleic acid sequences and
protecting databases. Indeed, with digitization, whatever the
4

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 1998, discussed below.
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practical uses to which the new information is to be put, it is
information (data, if you will) that is protected. And it is
information in the form of research results and data that may be
denied to the academic enterprise.
Information has some important economic characteristics.
Information is a public good. By that economists mean that my use
of information does not exclude or place any costs on your use of the
same information. The reason that the public goods character of
innovation information is important is that information is normally
costly to create, yet cheap to copy. The innovator therefore cannot
appropriate for himself the benefits of his innovation. In order to
provide an incentive to innovate, society accords a right to exclude
others. In the case of patent, the patentee can exclude others from
making, using, or selling the product or process. Copyright protects
only against copying, and therefore independent innovation is a
defense against an infringement charge.5 The controversy over the
protection of databases involves information that lacks sufficient
originality to be accorded copyright protection but is nonetheless
valuable information that is costly to assemble in useful form.
In each of these cases—patent, copyright, and database
protection—there is little controversy over the fact that without
some protection, less innovation would occur. The incentive to
innovate is therefore the second analytical principle. Incentive is
especially important for the kind of innovation that requires large
expenditures of funds and diligent, sustained application of human
energy and intelligence. And in some fields, such as pharmaceuticals
where statutorily required clinical trials are often far more costly than
the innovation itself, society would benefit from far fewer new
products if patents did not protect not just the innovation itself but
the development and testing activities necessary for society to receive
direct benefit.
Just as important as the incentive principle is access to the
innovation. Access is thus the third, and for universities, perhaps the
5

Although the U.S. copyright statute speaks of writings and authors, copyright
protection originally protected innovative charts, maps and the like and today
protection has been extended to certain aspects of computer software code.
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property
Protection of Software, 24 J. Legal Studies 321, 323-324 (1995).
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key principle from the standpoint of academic research. There are
many kinds of access issues, particularly in patent law, but the
essence of the access principle is that we want not only to encourage
the original innovator but we want also to encourage those who
come later to build on and add value to the original innovation, and
for that they must have access to that innovation. It is not enough
for them, alluding to the most famous epigram in intellectual
property, to stand on the shoulders of giants, they must be able to
see what the giants saw and did. Thus, in intellectual property,
innovation is not seen as a one-time thing; what counts is continued
innovation over time.
This is all the more true when the original innovation was the
product of basic research. The reason why public funding of basic
research is justified, even in the eyes of the most market-oriented
economist, is that the benefits of the research supposedly cannot be
readily appropriated by the researcher. Yet if intellectual property ties
up the results of that innovation so that they cannot be utilized by
those who come later, then the very principle on which public
funding is justified is undermined. So it is straightforward to argue
that the results of publicly funded basic research should be made
openly available to all.
The problem we are dealing with in connection with
biotechnology arises because it is hard to say what is basic and what
is applied research in view of the speedy transmutation of basic
research results into products and processes of immediate direct
value to mankind. And if the information derived from privately
financed research is to be protected, then there is little basis in law or
justice to deny patent protection to innovations resulting from
publicly financed research. Indeed, it was precisely the legislative
judgment behind Bayh-Dole that government agencies were failing
to patent innovations they financed and, when they did obtain
patents, they vitiated the usefulness of the patents by licensing them
nonexclusively to private firms, thereby giving none of the private
firms the necessary exclusivity to have an incentive to expend the
necessary funds for further development and for bringing the
innovation to market.6
6

For an analysis of the arguments used to support passage of Bayh-Dole, see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
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Patent law does provide for providing access to second-comers
by requiring what is called “disclosure.” No patent is valid that does
not only describe the invention in “clear, precise, and exact terms”
but also disclose sufficient information to enable second-comers to
practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” And, in a
unique provision of American law, the patent applicant is required to
disclose the best mode he contemplates to carry out his invention.
But these two forms of disclosure, though formally enough
information to practice the invention, often turns out to be
insufficient in fact (given that patentees have an incentive to provide
the least possible information). As a result, most patent licenses also
provide for the transfer of the underlying know-how. In any event,
the statutorily-demanded disclosure is rarely sufficient for the
academic researcher, and for two reasons: First, it normally does not
include the underlying data generated in the research leading to the
invention and, second, it is usually far out-of-date when finally
published. In American law publication does not occur until the
patent issues, which is some two to three or even more years after the
filing of the patent application, which itself may not occur until up
to one year after the invention and occasionally longer.
By far the biggest weakness in the disclosure requirement, at
least from the standpoint of academic researchers, is that the
required disclosure may contain little scientific or technical data and
therefore be of only general interest. Moreover, the invention may
not be directly useable by the research community until the patent
expires. That is because a patent not only excludes others from
selling the invention but also from making and using it. American
law has long recognized, though much less precisely than other legal
systems because of our reliance on case law for this point, that noncommercial researchers should be able to make and use the invention
for the purpose of research and further innovation. And so we
supposedly give the researcher an “experimental use” defense to any
infringement action.7 Unfortunately, it is precisely in fields like the
biomedical sciences, where even publicly-financed basic research may
Technology Transfer in Federally Financed Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663
(1996).
7
See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 (1989).
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have short-term economic payoffs, that the experimental use defense
is least likely to be of benefit because the case law has tended to
reject the defense whenever the researcher might actually profit. One
possible improvement in American patent law would be to enact a
statutory experimental use defense for the benefit of academic
researchers, at least in the basic sciences. Such a provision was
introduced but not enacted in 1990.8
II.
I have spent some time building up the principles of patent law
even though the central patent-law controversy that led to this
conference involves a rather narrow set of issues concerning the
patenting of partial cDNA sequences—so-called Expressed
Sequence Tags (“ESTs”). This EST controversy is important is its
own terms. But in the fullness of time, and (in view of current
research developments) in perhaps not very much time at all, we will
have a complete map of the human genome, and this particular
controversy is likely to fade into memory. But of course there are
countless other genomes out there to map. Indeed, the issue for the
future may be the patenting of entire genomes. And the emergence
of a related controversy over the patenting of single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) simply demonstrates that it is not possible to
foresee in advance what problems will plague the patent system.9
Since by definition the patent system is designed to protect products
and processes arising in new technologies, patent law operates on the
assumption that we cannot devise a new protection system for each
new technology. This has not been true of copyright, where the
Congress has enacted special copyright legislation for a long list of
new technologies, and we do have several examples of sui generis
forms of protection for new technologies. Moreover, we have seen
special patent legislation for biotechnology in the 1995 amendment

8

See discussion of the circumstances of the 1990 bill in Eyal H. Barash,
Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Northwestern U. L. Rev.
667, 695 (1997).
9
A single nucleotide polymorphism “is simply a common alteration that occurs in
a single nucleotide base in a stretch of DNA.” Eliot Marshall, Snipping Away at
Genome Patenting, 277 Science 1752 (Sept. 19, 1997).
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concerning the non-obviousness requirement, and perhaps that is an
omen of a new future for patent law.10
Still, I would argue that patent law has shown itself quite
adaptable to new technologies. The requirements that an invention
not only be new but also non-obvious and that a practical utility be
demonstrated, together with the previously mentioned requirements
that the patent application precisely describe the invention and that
it show “enablement” and “best mode,” provide sufficient flexibility
for able judges to fashion sensible policy even for such startlingly
new fields as biotechnology.
We should therefore distinguish more directly commercial from
academic concerns about patenting in the area of biotechnology. The
commercial concern has been that a biotech firm, say Human
Genome Sciences, might obtain patents without having carried true
innovation through to conclusion, thus depriving those best situated
to come up with concrete products of direct and immediate benefit
for mankind—say pharmaceutical companies—of a fair opportunity
to obtain patent protection, except perhaps under license from EST
patentees. And an opposing concern has been that if ESTs were not
patentable, then perhaps later discoveries including the resulting
protein might be considered, in view of now well-known tools and
procedures, to be obvious and hence nonpatentable.11
Thus far the patent system has apparently not fallen prey to
either of these dangers. And the Commissioner of Patents has gone
a good way toward assuring the academic community that the patent
system will not fail us in this respect.12 Although I have not
attempted a search of issued patents, I do note that Human Genome
Sciences (the firm that was once at the center of the EST
controversy) stated on its web site, in a December 1, 1998, update,
that its patents “are designed to meet the traditional requirements of
novelty, utility and enablement” and that they “describe the medical
10

35 U.S.C. 102(b).
The incentive and access aspects of the EST issue are explored in Kenneth W.
Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology, University
of Chicago Law and Economics Working Paper No. 35 (1995).
12
See for example, letters from Bruce A. Lehman to Harold E. Varmus (Director,
NIH), dated April 2, 1997, and to Bruce M. Alberts (President, National
Academy of Sciences), dated July 1997, setting forth the requirements with regard
to ESTs.
11
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uses of more than 2,000 newly discovered individual human genes “
as well as describe “full-length cDNAs that code for entire human
proteins.” If I interpret this language correctly (and of course there
are various bases on which these HGS formulations may lead one
astray), it would appear that despite earlier fears that partial
sequences without known utility would be accorded patents, the
Patent Office is in practice requiring “full-length” sequences coding
for “entire human proteins.” On the other hand, at least one recently
issued patent can be considered an EST patent.13 On balance, so far
as I have determined, the fear of a flood of EST patents being issued
is, at minimum, overdrawn.
Even if EST patents are not issued, a flood of biotech and
genomic patents are now beginning to emerge, and an important
question is what the consequences will be. Michael Heller and
Rebecca Eisenberg have warned us against a forthcoming “tragedy of
the anticommons.”14 Building on the well-known “tragedy of the
commons” where people overuse shared resources,15 Heller and
Eisenberg hypothesize that people will underuse biomedical
innovation because there will simply be too many patents out there
in the hands of too many diverse firms. Certainly, they admit,
companies with plans for new pharmaceuticals or other biomedical
products can theoretically assemble the rights through license
negotiations. But they warn that, in practice, “transactions costs” (an
all-purpose law-and-economics term referring to actual costs,
uncertainties and just plain miscalculation and irrationality of
negotiating parties) will prevent many worthwhile products from
appearing.
An “anticommons” is a serious possibility that we should worry
about, but in my view it is less of a risk than that insufficient patent
protection will be granted where it is most needed—that is, not just
for the original research but also where large expenditures and big
risks have to be incurred to develop biomedical products, to carry out
the necessary clinical trials, and to launch those products
13

U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (Oct. 6, 1998) on Human Kinase Homologs, issued
to Au-Young et al. and assigned to Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc..
14
Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (May 1, 1998).
15
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
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successfully. Several points have to be kept in mind. First,
pharmaceutical and medical supply companies have long been
accustomed to assembling rights. Second, joint venture licensing
arrangements along the lines of those between Human Genome
Sciences and Incyte, on the one hand, and an increasing number of
pharmaceutical firms, on the other, may grow in pace with the
proliferation of property rights.16 While these licensing arrangements
may not meet the needs of academic researchers, they do suggest
that the proliferation of gene patents is unlikely to hold back the
development of new pharmaceuticals of benefit to human beings.
Indeed, and this is a third point, if it were not for well-defined,
enforceable property rights in the form of patents, one could
anticipate even greater uncertainty, miscalculation and other
transactions costs.
The anticommons is not a new threat. A number of industries
have turned to patent pools, at least when the Antitrust Division did
not interfere, to solve similar problems.17 In a classical patent pool,
patents are licensed to a central agent. A similar, and I suspect much
more widely used, technique is voluntary, industry-wide crosslicensing. Certainly the computer hardware industry, which faced an
equally daunting problem of proliferating patent rights and where
speed to market was at least as much a survival necessity as in
biotechnology, long used patent cross-licensing with remarkable
effectiveness. With cross-licensing of its computer hardware
portfolio each firm could bring new products to market without
worrying about patents held by their competitors. The cross-licenses
were renewed periodically for a period of years so that they covered
future-issued patents, and the incentive to innovate remained both
because side-payments based on the strength of patent portfolios
were made and because innovation still paid off in enabling firms to
16

For a description of these licensing arrangements, which differ considerably in
detail between Human Genome Sciences and Incyte, see Roberta S. Eisenberg,
Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale
cDNA Sequencing, 3 Univ. Chicago Law School Roundtable 557, (1996).
17
Similar problems have been solved in the copyright industries through collective
rights organizations. See for a treatment of the legal and economic policy issues in
patent pools and collective rights organizations, Robert P. Merges, Contracting
into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (1996) (hereafter “Merges on Contracting”).
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be first to market, not just among the cross-licensing firms but also
to fend off the incursions of new firms.18
The policy issue is whether it is better to restrict patent rights in
the biomedical field in view of the potential dangers of the
anticommons or, as an alternative, to consider how the biomedical
industries can solve the problem without incurring the certain
problems of insufficient property rights in biomedical innovation. In
that regard, the rapid growth of new kinds of firms does caution
against overconfidence that the anticommons problem can be
surmounted. The computer hardware industry had few problems
with its cross-licensing arrangements until new kinds of
semiconductor firms and foreign consumer products firms arose that,
at least initially, preferred exclusivity over freedom to market; but
even those problems have been largely surmounted because the joint
economic surplus to be shared between differently situated firms has
been a sufficient incentive to make the requisite licensing
negotiations succeed. Still, it is worth noting that while software
patents have been successfully cross-licensed, such cross-licensing
arrangements do not extend systematically to the software industry
as a whole, despite the fact that some new programs may also
potentially infringe many diversely held patents. Perhaps software
patent licensing cross-licensing will become the rule in the industry;
it is easy to forget that the software industry as we know it is not all
that much older than the biotech industry. Of course, if all else fails
and the anticommons becomes a serious problem in practice, there is
still the remedy of compulsory licensing available. However, the
well-known problems involved in compulsory licensing schemes
having to do with valuation of inventions and with the likelihood of
18

IBM alone generates more than $1 billion annually in patent royalties, a major
portion of which comes from side payments to IBM as a firm with an especially
strong patent portfolio. For a description of the cross-licensing process, see Peter
C. Grindley and David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital, 39 California
Management Rev. 8 (Winter 1997). The computer hardware industry is an
example of what has been called “cumulative systems technologies” where end
products frequently potentially infringe many patents in the hands of a number of
different firms. Robert Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Columbia L. Rev. 839, 884-897 (1990); Richard
A. Nelson, Benefits and Costs of Strong Statutory Protection: A Contribution to
the Current Debate, 27 Research Policy 273, 280-281 (1998).
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burdensome legal and administrative expenses make compulsory
licensing very much a second-best solution.19
III.
Even if we avoid the anticommons trap in the commercial
world, we may still not have safeguarded the needs of the academic
enterprise for rapid access to, and sharing of, research results and
data. The basic problem here is not the patent system but the fact
that the Bayh-Dole legislation and the dual basic and applied nature
of so much biotech investigation has rendered the modern research
university itself uncertain of what it prefers. Fortunately for the
future of such universities, most of them have gone far to make sure
that the desire to file patent applications does not materially slow
down their own scholars’ publishing of new research results. Indeed,
U.S. patent law, in contrast to most foreign systems, accommodates
academic scientific publication by providing a one-year grace period
so that the inventor has up to one year after publication to file a
patent application.20
So far as academic access to valuable research results of
commercial firms is concerned, a possible partial solution would be
to enact U.S. legislation leading to publication of patent applications
prior to issuance of the patent—namely, eighteen months after
filing. This is legislation to which the U.S. is internationally
committed and which most other countries already have on their
books. Indeed, since most U.S. firms in biotech and pharmaceutical
research seek patents in other major countries, they are driven under
the first-to-file system used in other countries to file just as soon as
possible and then to publish their applications after eighteen
months. However, nothing in current law, here in the United States
or elsewhere, can make a company disclose its research data beyond
19

See Merges on Contracting supra at 1307ff.
See Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy 225-226 (2d ed. 1997). A related
issue is whether the lure of private profit diverts university scientists from their role
in adding to scientific knowledge. It is reassuring that in the biotech area recent
research shows that “scientists who are more involved in commercialization and
patenting are more productive scientifically during their period of involvement.”
Lynne G. Zucker and Michael R. Darby, Entrepreneurs, Star Scientists, and
Biotechnology, NBER Reporter 7 (Fall 1998).
20
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the minimum that patent law requires, but the motivation to keep
that data secret is a byproduct of the commercial realities, not the
patent law as such or the policies of the U.S. Patent Office.21
IV.
The other current intellectual property controversy that agitates
the academic research community today concerns database
protection. Here the same framework (involving information,
incentive and access) used above for patent issues throws light on the
underlying conflicting goals and values. Surely there can be no doubt
that what is proposed to be protected in the case of databases is pure
information. Information, albeit in an assembled and convenient
form, is in fact the product itself. That drives us to consider the
public goods aspect of the issue, and in particular to the issue of the
extent to which property rights should be developed to give an
incentive to develop new databases and to improve existing databases.
And that in turn raises the issue of the degree of access the law should
mandate, particularly for those engaged in basic research.
One of the reasons that the information-incentive-access
framework is promising is that the heat in the United States over the
database issue has sometimes obscured the issues. My impression is
that most informed critics recognize that incentives for the creation
of databases are important objectives, not least in science and
technology.22 And although some critics have argued that only
21
Still another issue is the cost to academic researchers of the patenting of
“research tools” in terms of having to pay commercial firms for patented biological
materials previously obtained essentially free from other academics. Naturally no
one likes to pay more than necessary, especially in underfunded academic
laboratories. However, one specific issue that may raise broader policy issues has to
do with the terms of licenses to use patented research tools. One example is the
reach-through license, in which the patentee reserves the rights to inventions made
by the licensee utilizing the patented research tool. See National Research
Council, Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology 17
(1997).
22
See, e.g., J. H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 51, 137-139, 145-155 (1997). And see Patent and
Trademark Office, Report on and Recommendations from April 1998 Conference
on Database Protection and Access Issues 26-30 (July 1998) (hereafter “PTO
Database Report”).
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copyrighted databases deserve protection, it is also true that many
intellectual property scholars are not entirely satisfied that the Feist
case involving the protection of telephone books sets the right
standard.23 After all, if pharmaceutical companies are dependent on
patent law protection not just for the initial innovation but also to
make possible the massive further expenditures for such things as
clinical trials that are necessary for the ultimate consumer to enjoy an
actual benefit, it may also be true that “sweat-of-the-brow”
expenditures can in economic terms justify some protection for what
are uncopyrightable databases under Feist.
In fact, most critics of database protection are prepared to
concede that some carefully limited protection against out-and-out
piracy of databases is desirable, even though they may be
uncopyrightable under Feist. The issues are more ones of detail. For
example, are the time limits for protection correctly drawn in view of
the fact that by regularly updating a database the database owner
may as a practical matter bypass the 15 year time limit and thereby
enjoy de facto perpetual protection even for those portions of the
database that are older than the time-limit period?24
It is my impression that academic researchers are not so worried
about access as such as they are about databases becoming too
expensive for their budgets. Although some such objections from
academia are self-serving in view of the readiness with which
academic institutions buy books, microscopes, and all the other
accoutrements of research, a National Research Council panel found
that in most fields of academic research there is only a single relevant
database (unlike some commercial databases such as stock quotation
services where competition is abundant).25 Thus, the fear is one of
monopoly pricing. Although it might be argued that monopoly
pricing should be a question for the antitrust authorities, not for
intellectual property policy, the principle is well-established that the
antitrust laws do not prohibit an intellectual property owner from
pricing in such a way as to maximize income (at least so long as there
is no price discrimination between classes of purchasers). That is

23

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See J. H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, supra at 85.
25
National Research Council, Bits of Power (1997).
24
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what is meant in the patent context by the popular if not entirely
accurate phrase that a patent is a legal monopoly.
The likelihood of full monopoly pricing is easily exaggerated.
Just because there may be only one database in a particular scientific
field, it does not follow that full monopoly prices can be charged. To
attempt to do so could easily invite entry. Even with strong
intellectual property protection against wholesale copying of
databases and with a demand structure that can support but one
database, the right to be that one database provider is contestable.
The resulting threat of entry is likely to constrain pricing to less than
the full monopoly price, at least where the underlying data is publicly
available for assembly.26 To deny protection where the market can
support only one database would reduce the frequency with which
such niche markets are served at all by databases.
In any event, it is generally agreed in the patent area that to
deny a patentee freedom of pricing would undercut the entire public
goods rationale for patent protection. Thus, one is driven squarely
back to whether legal protection for databases is justified by the
public goods rationale and the consequent need for an incentive. If
so, the monopoly pricing argument is a red herring. To be sure, in
this digital world in which data is exploding, particularly in the
world of science and technology, access to databases may become a
heavy load for universities and their government agency funders to
bear. Laura Tyson, former Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, observing that information is not cost-free, argues that if
academic researchers find databases too expensive for their budgets,
the remedy is for government to put more money into research, not
to seek what is in effect a subsidy from the database provider,
especially if the ultimate question is “protected databases or no
databases.”27 A written report signed by Tyson makes the obvious
26

See for a comparable argument in a non-database context, Douglas Gary
Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81
Minn. L. Rev. 693 (1997). The number of truly sole source databases is a
controversial issue. The Patent Office quite properly points out that one should
distinguish the situation where the underlying data is uniquely and exclusively held
by one party from the situation where the data remains available for collection by
others. See PTO Database Report at 24-26.
27
Linda R. Raber, Database Protection, Chemical and Engineering News 27, 28
(Nov. 17, 1997) .
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point that preferential pricing for academic uses would in principle
be less efficient than a direct subsidy from the government and that
it could be expected that free use of database information by
academic users would “adversely affect the growth of information
over time to both their own detriment and to the detriment of
paying users.”28 On this point the National Research Council panel
report reflects the natural position of academic scientists facing a
sudden increase in the cost of an important research tool without any
prospect of additional compensatory government funding: “Despite a
general consensus on the need for sustained levels of investment in
research and development, the proposed database laws could change
the status quo—without anyone’s wanting it to happen—by
elevating the price of the one raw material to which U.S. researchers
have always had ready access.”29
From the standpoint of legal policy, as opposed to science
policy, the issue can be conceptualized as one of fair use. Many legal
critics of database protection are scandalized by the fact that
although Feist-type uncopyrightable databases by definition involve
less creative input than copyrightable works, the latter are available
free-of-charge in limited circumstances to academic users under the
statutory principle of fair use; but there is no comparable fair use
provision in either the EU directive or the original U.S.
administration proposals.30 Since the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes is one of the four statutory criteria in
28

Laura D’Andrea Tyson and Edward F. Sherry, Statutory Protection for
Databases: Economic and Public Policy Issues 26, 27 (Sept. 5, 1997) (prepared by
the Law and Economics Consulting Group for two international publishing
companies).
29
National Research Council, Bits of Power 9 (1997).
30
The EU Directive does contain an exception for “extraction for the purpose of
illustration for teaching and academic research,” but the term “illustration” hardly
meets the needs of the scientific research user. The U.S. Administration did,
however, send a letter to the Congress in August 1998 stating: “Any database
misappropriation regime should provide exceptions analogous to ‘fair use’
principles of copyright law; in particular. any effects on non-commercial research
should be de minimis.” Letter of Andrew J. Pincus, Department of Commerce, to
Senator Orrin G. Hatch (August 4, 1998) (hereafter “Administration Letter”). See
also PTO Database Report, supra, 16-21.
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determining whether academic use infringes a copyright, it is ironic
that no such defense would be available for databases not sufficiently
creative to be worthy of copyright. Moreover, since the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work is
a second of the four statutory criteria, academic use for a single
research project would arguably be fair use, although it has to be
recognized that some database publishers find the academic market
their principal market.31
Use for academic research is not piracy, the suppression of
which is supposedly the central purpose of the database bill, because
the legitimate academic researcher does not reoffer the contents of
the database in competition with the original provider. And those
research institutions that seek to add value to the existing database
by adding data and substantially improving the original database
would, in a copyright context, have a defense that their use was
“transformative” and hence “fair use,” constituting new innovation
built on a first-generation product. The failure of the database bill
to provide a comparable defense was singled out by the Federal
Trade Commission as a threat to continuing innovation.32
The database bill, which had passed the House of
Representatives, was stripped out of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in conference in the waning days of the last
Congressional Session in October. It seems likely, however, that the
battle is not over, at least so long as the European Union retains the
reciprocity provision in its Database Directive. This reciprocity
provision would deny protection within the EU to U.S. database
31

Some versions of the database bill did contain an exception approximating this
latter fair use criterion. The House of Representatives did pass a database bill in
1998, not subsequently enacted, that permitted “extracting or using information
for nonprofit education, scientific, or research purposes” as long as such activity
“does not harm the actual or potential market” for a database. This provision
would not afford fair use academic scientific access to databases marketed to the
academic scientific community. See PTO Database Report, supra, at 24.
Moreover, extraction of an “insubstantial part” of a database was permitted, but
this ambiguous provision, even with the additional exception for uses not harming
the actual or potential market for the product, fell short of the fair use provisions
of the copyright statute.
32
Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to
Congressman Bliely (Sept. 28, 1998).
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developers so long as the United States does not provide comparable
protection. Since the House version provided for database protection
and since Senator Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, promised to introduce database protection legislation in
the next Session as one of the highest priorities of his committee, we
can expect the database controversy to be revisited in the coming
year. However, Senator Hatch has stated that his approach takes
account of the fear that recognizing a property right in databases
would hamper scientific research.33
Even if one comes out on the side of protection for
uncopyrightable databases, a difficult question is to what extent
database protection should be available where the underlying data
comes from governmental sources. After all, when the public has
paid for the generation of the individual data items, then we should
expect that they will be made available to the public in least-cost,
most convenient form. In effect, however, some government
agencies are privatizing the publication of research results they pay
for. This issue bears a striking resemblance to the Stevenson-Wydler
Act (passed in the same year as Bayh-Dole) which calls on
government research agencies to make their intellectual property
available through patent licensing for the benefit of the public and
the economy. Privatization of the distribution of governmentally
generated data is likely to make it more readily available, but who is
to bear the cost?34 And does it make a difference that privatization
would be ineffective without giving the private database company
exclusive rights (just Stevenson-Wydler assumes that government
agencies must be able to grant exclusive patent licenses in order to
promote commercialization)?
Here, as in the case of ESTs, I suspect that the current debate
over database protection, yes or no, is not as fundamental as some of
the related issues. In the October Congressional showdown over
database protection and as part of passing legislation implementing
two copyright treaties, the Congress accorded protection against
33

Statement by Senator Hatch in submitting the report of the conference
committee on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Oct. 8, 1998).
34
The Administration has taken the position that “databases generated with
Government funding generally should not be placed under exclusive control, de
jure or de facto, of private parties.” Administration Letter, supra, p. 1.
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circumvention of what they termed “copyright protection and
management systems,” which can be thought of as one class of selfhelp systems enabling copyright holders to protect their investment
at far less cost and with greater convenience to the legitimate nonfree-riding user than the formal copyright system.35 What was
implicit in this Congressional decision was a recognition that
intellectual property as such is not so important as preserving and
promoting a market system. If copyright owners are able to sell
access to their works and the right to copy them over the internet,
then the market in online services that we already see would develop
more rapidly than if users were able to defeat the encryption and
other self-help controls essential to such online marketing.
To that end the Digital Millennium Copyright Act contains a
provision prohibiting the circumvention of any “technological
measure that effectively controls access” to a copyrighted work as
well as the manufacture, importation or offer to the public of any
technology primarily produced for the purpose of such
circumvention. But since such measures may also make it impossible
for users to exercise their fair-use rights, the statute seeks to balance
provider and user rights through a system in which the Librarian of
Congress in a rule-making proceeding may authorize exceptions to
that prohibition for users of classes of works that “are adversely
affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to making
noninfringing uses of that particular class of works.”36 Since
educational institutions, especially libraries, felt especially at risk,
they brought their concerns forcefully to the attention of the
Congress and received a special but narrowly qualified exemption
concerning circumvention for the purpose of determining whether to
acquire a work.37 Clearly this exemption does not address needs of
scientific researchers to override self-help systems in order to exercise
fair use rights in the online environment. In the rule-making
proceeding, the Librarian of Congress is to take into account the

35

On the nature of these systems, and their policy pros and cons, see Kenneth W.
Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, University of Chicago Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 59 (1998).
36
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998), 17 U.S.C. §1201.
37
17 U.S.C. §1201(d).
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impact of the circumvention prohibition on “teaching, scholarship or
research.” 38
To a large extent this rule-making provision simply defers to the
future the debate over self-help in the online environment, at least so
far as educational and scientific research is concerned. In any case,
the new statute applies only to copyrighted works and leaves open
the role of self-help systems in any future legislation on
uncopyrightable databases that may emerge in the future. Further
legislative confrontation on database protection issues thus appears
inevitable.

38

The new statutory prohibition, 17 U.S.C. §1201, takes effect two years after the
October 1998 enactment. During this two-year period the Library of Congress is
to conduct a rule-making proceeding to determine whether users of a copyrighted
work are adversely affect by the prohibition “in their ability to make noninfringing
uses...of a particular class of copyrighted work....” In the rule-making proceeding
the Librarian is to examine “the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention
of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.”

This paper is due to be published in the proceedings of a conference
on The Changing Use and Character of Intellectual Property held at
the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. on
December 3-4, 1998, and sponsored by the German-American
Academic Council Foundation. All rights reserved. Readers with
comments should address them to:

Kenneth W. Dam
Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries
and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach (July
1991).
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort (August 1991).
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism
(September 1991).
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of
Contract (February 1992).
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools (February 1992).
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation
of AIDS (April 1992).
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April
1992).
William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An
Economic Analysis (July 1992).
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of
Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study (August 1992).
Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law:
A Theoretical Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy
(September 1992).
Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing
Contracts (November 1992).
Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life
(January 1993).
J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages:
Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan (March 1993).
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law
(April 1993).
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everyone Else Does) (April 1993).
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital
(August 1993).

17. J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The
Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993).
18. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Anticipatory Adjudication (September 1993).
19. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law (September 1993).
20. Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis
(October 1993).
21. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle
(March 1994).
22. Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the
Law (June 1994).
23. William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis
(June 1994).
24. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from
Early Modern Japan (August 1994).
25. Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows
(August 1994).
26. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the
Intellectual Property Protection of Software (August 1994).
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994).
28. David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond
Cimino (December 1994).
29. Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational
Distribution of Lifetime Consumption (January 1995).
30. Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract
Damages (February 1995).
31. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller,
Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation
(March 1995).
32. Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the
American Business Enterprise (April 1995).
33. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995).
34. J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995).
35. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software
and Biotechnology (November 1995).

36. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January
1996).
37. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence
in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan (January 1996).
38. Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or
Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? (March 1996).
39. Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996).
40. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Legal Disputes Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other
Collectibles (July 1996).
41. John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence,
and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns (August 1996).
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs (September 1996).
43. Douglas G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An
Overview of the la and Economics of Financially Distressed
Firms (March 1997).
44. Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March
1997).
45. William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An
Autobiographical Essay (March 1997).
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997).
47. John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral
Competitiveness: Evidence from California’s State Legislative
Races (May 1997).
48. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A
Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms (June 1997).
49. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large:
Contract Law through the Lens of Laissez-Faire (August
1997).
50. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law) (December 1997).
51. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E.
Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998).
52. John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign
Expenditures are Increasing: The Government is Getting
Bigger (February 1998).

53. Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction
to Economic Analysis of Law (March 1998).
54. Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and
Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens? (April 1998).
55. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics (May 1998).
56. John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?:
Affirmative Action, Police Departments, and Crime (May
1998).
57. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order
Decisions (June 1998).
58. Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages:
Their Determinants, Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of
Supreme Court and Congressional Attempts to Limit Awards
(July 1998).
59. Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (August
1998).
60. John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women’s Suffrage
Change the Size and Scope of Government? (September 1998)
61. Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of
Chapter 11 (October 1998)
62. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in
the Tax Law (November 1998)
63. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law (November 1998)
64. John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and
Totalitarianism (December 1998)
65. Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest:
Notes Toward A “Third Way” (January 1999)
66. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence (February 1999)
67. Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared
Information Goods (February 1999)
68. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic
Enterprise (February 1999)

